UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-28-2014

State v. Nichols Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38123

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Nichols Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38123" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3977.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3977

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B.#5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
1.8.8. #7901
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

)

v.

)

TIMOTHY NICHOLS,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 38123

)

ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2009-4407

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Timothy Nichols asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 6 (Ct. App. February 24, 2014) (hereinafter,
Opinion). He asks that this Court grant his petition for review because this case deals
with issues of first impression and because the underlying opinion by the Idaho Court of
Appeals is likely in conflict with prior precedent from this Court.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Nichols was charged by information with statutory rape.

(R., pp.17-18.)

Thereafter, the State filed a motion in limine with the district court seeking to preclude
Mr. Nichols from raising any defense to this charge with regard to either mistake of age
or consent.

(R., pp.33-36.)

The State asserted that any such defenses would be

irrelevant to the charge of statutory rape under I.R.

401 in light of Idaho case law that

indicated that neither mistake of age or consent can stand as a defense to an allegation
of rape pursuant to I.C. § 18-6101(1). (R., pp.33-36.)
At the hearing on the State's motion in limine, Mr. Nichols addressed two sets of
concerns with regard to his case: first, he asserted that he should be allowed to raise
the defenses of good faith mistake as to age and consent against the charge of
statutory rape; and second, Mr. Nichols asserted that his case presented a corpus

delicti issue if the alleged victim did not testify at trial.

(Tr., p.8, L.i0 - p.i8, L.i5.)

However, because Mr. Nichols was not personally present for this hearing, the district
court delayed any ruling on these issues. (Tr., p.6, L.ii - p.?, L.24, p.i8, L.i? - p.i9,
L.?)
Following this hearing, the State submitted two sets of briefing - one addressing
the issue of corpus delicti and one providing supplemental authority regarding the
potential defenses at trial of consent and/or mistake of age. (R., pp.46-52.) Regarding
the corpus delicti issue, the State asserted that the testimony of the alleged victim was
not necessary in order to establish the corpus delicti of the offense in this case.
(R., pp.46-4?) But the only "corroboration" of Mr. Nichols' confession offered up by the

State was that he was living with the alleged victim at the time that a police officer was
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dispatched to his home 1 and that the alleged victim's mother stated to police that she
came to Idaho from her home in Washington State in order to retrieve the alleged
victim. (R., p.47.)
Regarding Mr. Nichols' intent to claim consent and/or reasonable mistake
regarding age as a defense, the State asserted that the primary case relied upon by
Mr. Nichols in his argument, Lawrence v. Texas, was inapposite to his claim because
the Lawrence Opinion's holding was expressly limited to private, consensual encounters
between adults. (R., pp.49-51.) The State also provided the district court with case law
from other jurisdictions reaching a similar conclusion. (R., pp.50-51.)
The district court took up the issues relating to the State's motion in limine on the
day of trial. The court granted the State's motion in limine to preclude Mr. Nichols from
raising any defense as to good faith mistake regarding the alleged victim's age, or
raising any defense of consent. (Tr., p.26, L.21

p.31, L.5.) However, the court did not

address the issue previously raised by Mr. Nichols regarding the absence of any
evidence or corroboration of the corpus delicti of the charged offense aside from his
confession. (Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.31, L.15.)
The State presented only three witnesses at trial. The first was Melody Fairfax,
K.F.'s adopted mother. (Tr., p.50, L.3 - p.51, L.6.) Ms. Fairfax was not present when
K.F. was born. (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-19.) She was only told that K.F. was approximately 10
months old when Ms. Fairfax adopted K.F.; and she further testified that, as part of the

1 This Court may wish to note that this purported "corroboration" - i.e. that K.F. and
Mr. Nichols were living together - was itself only evinced by Mr. Nichols' statements and
confession to law enforcement, and therefore this would not constitute "corroboration" of
the same confession.
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adoption process, she was given a birth certificate for K.F. that listed her date and place
of birth. (Tr., p.51, L.3

p.52, L.i8.) Mr. Nichols objected to the testimony regarding

K.F.'s birth date on hearsay grounds, but the district court originally held that this was
not hearsay. (Tr., p.53, Ls.2-22.)
Ms. Fairfax also testified that K.F. was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder
and Asperger's Syndrome.

(Tr., p.54, Ls.1-9.) Unfortunately, K.F. apparently would

refuse to take her medications for these conditions and frequently ran away from home.
(Tr., p.54, Ls.i0-i7.) K.F. had apparently run away from home prior to being found at
Mr. Nichols' residence in Idaho. (Tr., p.54, L.18

p.56, L.7.) In fact, at the time of trial

K.F. had again run away from home and her whereabouts were unknown. (Tr., p.57,
Ls.5-6.)

By Ms. Fairfax's estimation, K.F. had run away from home between 15-20

times in the past. (Tr., p.66, L.25 - p.67, L.8.) Ms. Fairfax further testified that she was
at the point where she refused to report K.F. as missing to law enforcement given her
history for running away. (Tr., p.66, L.25 - p.67, L.8.)
The second witness for the State was Detective Ty Larsen, who was a detective
with the Mountain Home police department. (Tr., p.68, L.22 - p.69, L.23.) Detective
Larsen testified that he contacted Mr. Nichols after receiving a report that Mr. Nichols
might be living with a potential runaway.

(Tr., p.70, L.8 - p.71, LA.)

Upon being

contacted, Mr. Nichols agreed to come in to the police station for an interview.
(Tr., p.71, Ls.15-22.)
According to the officer, Mr. Nichols admitted that he and K.F. were residing
together in a two-bedroom apartment for about one month.

(Tr., p.85, L.25 - p.86,

L.22.) Mr. Nichols stated to the officer that he had come to Idaho from Washington
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state, and that K.F. had moved with him. He further allegedly admitted that he and K.F.
were involved in a dating relationship. (Tr., p.86, L.23

p.87,

L.~18.)

Detective Larsen provided the only testimony at a" during the trial that indicated
any sexual relationship between K.F. and Mr. Nichols, and this came solely from
Mr. Nichols' alleged confessions to the officer. The detective testified that Mr. Nichols
admitted to engaging in sexual intercourse as part of this dating relationship. (Tr., p.88,
L.8 - 89, L.8.) But Detective Larsen never verified at a" that the two were, in fact, living
together in Idaho. (Tr., p.94, L.24

p.95, L.8.)

The final witness presented by the State was another police officer

Officer

Humberto Fuentes, also with the Mountain Home police department. (Tr., p.98, L.22
p.99, L.2.) Officer Fuentes was the officer who first responded to a dispatch regarding a
potential runaway.

(Tr., p.100, L.18 - p.101, L.2.)

When the officer arrived at

Mr. Nichols' house, he observed Mr. Nichols and K.F. sitting underneath a tree in the
front yard of the residence. (Tr., p.103, Ls.5-9.) K.F. appeared to be upset and crying,
and Mr. Nichols was trying to comfort her.

(Tr., p.103, Ls.12-17.)

Officer Fuentes

talked to Mr. Nichols, who a"egedly told the officer that he and K.F. resided at the
apartment together and had moved there from Washington. (Tr., p.103, L.24 - p.105,
L.6.) After confirming that K.F. was a runaway, Officer Fuentes placed her in custody
and called her mother. (Tr., p.107, L.19-p.109, L.22.)
The officer never saw any identification from K.F. that listed a birth date and had
no personal knowledge of her age. (Tr., p.111, Ls.3-19.)
After the testimony of Officer Fuentes, Mr. Nichols moved the district court
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29 (hereinafter, Rule 29) for a judgment of acquittal on
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the basis that the State had failed to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense.
(Tr., p.116, L.10 - p.123, L.5.) The district court denied this motion and held that no
independent proof of intercourse was actually required in order to establish the corpus

delicti of the charged offense. (Tr., p.120, L.14 - p.123, L.5.) And so the jury was never
instructed regarding corpus delicti. (Tr., p.133, L.g - p.140, L.22.)
The district court did provide a non-pattern jury instruction with regard to the
statutory elements of statutory rape in Idaho. (Tr., p.135, L.13 - p.136, L.1.) However,
the court's instruction failed to inform the jurors that they had to find that Mr. Nichols had
penetrated K.F. with his penis - they merely instructed the jurors that any finding of
vaginal penetration would suffice. (Tr., p.135, L.13 - p.136, L.1.)
During

closing

arguments,

the

prosecutor

made

several

statements

characterizing the testimony that was provided at trial. In the process, the prosecutor
misstated the testimony of both Detective Larsen and Officer Fuentes, referring to facts
that were not in evidence at trial. With regard to Detective Larsen, the prosecutor stated
that the detective had testified that Mr. Nichols and K.F. had "both slept in one bed," in
the same room during the time that K.F. was alleged to have lived with Mr. Nichols.
(Tr., p.146, L.22.) As to Officer Fuentes' testimony, the prosecutor told the jury that:
During the course or based upon what he learned from the interview with
[K.F.], he felt that something wasn't right. And because he felt something
wasn't right about what he heard, he then passed his report on to the
detective division so further investigation could be performed.
(Tr., p.143, Ls.15-21.) Contrary to the representations of the State, Officer Fuentes
never testified about feeling "something wasn't right," based upon the statements of K.F.
The jury convicted Mr. Nichols of statutory rape. (Tr., p.164, L.16 - p.167, L.5;

R., p.68.) After the trial had already concluded, the district court returned to its earlier
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ruling with regard to K.F.'s mother's testimony regarding K.F.'s date of birth. (R., p.73.)
Although acknowledging that, at trial, the court had characterized this testimony as "not
hearsay," the district court amended this conclusion and instead found that this
testimony fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. (R., p.73.) Specifically, the court
found that this testimony fell within the exception for reputation concerning personal or
family history provided under !.R.E. 803(19). (R., p.73.) The district court entered its
memorandum regarding this ruling apparently in order to "augment" the court's prior
ruling. (R., p.73.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Nichols to 10 years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction over his case.

(4/2/10 Tr., p.33, L.4 - p.34, L.1; R., pp.90-92.)

Prior to the expiration of the district court's period of retained jurisdiction, the court
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Nichols' case and executed his sentence without
reduction. (Tr., p.208, Ls.12-18; R., pp.113-114.) Thereafter, Mr. Nichols filed a timely
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking a reduction of his
sentence, which was denied by the district court without a hearing.

(Motion for

Correction or Reduction of Sentence, Augment; Memorandum Decision on Defendant's
Motion for Reduction of Sentence, Augment.)
district

court's

order

re-imposing

his

Mr. Nichols timely appealed from the

sentence

and

relinquishing

jurisdiction.

(R., pp.116-119.)

During the pendency of this appeal, this Court granted the State's petition for
review in State v. Suriner and further granted Mr. Nichols' motion to stay appellate
proceedings pending a decision from this Court regarding the corpus delicti issue in that

2

State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81 (2013).
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case.

Thereafter, in a published opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed

Mr. Nichols' judgment of conviction and sentence for statutory rape. (Opinion, pp.1-18.)
This petition for review timely followed.
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ISSUES
1.

Should this Court grant Mr. Nichols' petition for review?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 motion seeking a
judgment of acquittal because the State presented insufficient evidence to
establish the corpus delicti independent of Mr. Nichols' confessions and
statements?

3.

Did the district court err when it permitted the introduction of inadmissible
hearsay in order to establish the age of the alleged victim in this case?

4.

Did the district court's jury instructions in this case impermissibly lower the
State's burden of proof, and therefore constitute fundamental error, when the
district court provided an elements instruction for the offense of statutory rape
that omitted an essential element and when the district court failed to sua sponte
instruct the jury regarding corpus delicti?

5.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error,
when the prosecutor misstated the testimony provided at trial and introduced
facts not in evidence for the jury's consideration during closing arguments?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Grant Mr. Nichols Petition For Review And Reverse His Judgment Of
Conviction For Statutory Rape In Light Of The Errors That Occurred At His Trial
Although left unaddressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, Mr. Nichols'
case presents an important issue that is left unresolved by that opinion: whether this
Court's prior ruling in Suriner, which abolished the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, can be
retroactively applied to those defendants whose trials occurred prior to the issuance of
that decision.

(See Opinion, p.3 n.3 (indicating that the Court of Appeals would not

resolve this issue in light of its disposition that sufficient proof of corroboration existed at
trial).) Mr. Nichols asks that this Court grant his petition for review and clarify that,
under due process principles, this Court's ruling in Suriner eliminating the corpus delicti
rule, is prospective in application.
It is well established that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws
precludes a legislative enactment from being applied retroactively to a criminal
defendant where that action, among other things, operates so as to alter the legal rules
of evidence so as to receive different or less testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the alleged offense. See, e.g., Carmel! v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513,
521-522 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1990). Although the ex

post facto clauses of the State and federal constitutions apply by their terms only to
legislative enactments and provisions, the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides similar protections with regard to judicial actions that operate in a
similar manner.

Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977).

This due

process protection emanates from the Fifth Amendment of the United States
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Constitution, and "is based on the notion that persons have the right to fair warning of
that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties."

Id.; see also State v.

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374 n.8 (2010).

The United States Supreme Court made this clear in Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347 (1964).

In Bouie, the Court held that, "[t]here can be no doubt that a

deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language
but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise
statutory language." Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352. The Bouie Court further expanded on the
nature of such a due process violation when a reviewing court unexpectedly alters the
common law to a defendant's detriment:
Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute,
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as
Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. An ex post facto law has been
defined by this Court as one "that makes an action done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
which punishes such action" or "that aggravates a crime, or makes it
greater than it was, when committed." If a state legislature is barred by
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a
State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving
precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental
principle that "the required criminal law must have existed when the
crime occurred" must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions
emanating from courts as well as from legislatures. If a judicial
construction of a criminal statute is "unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in
issue," it must not be given retroactive effect.
Id. at 353-354 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Subsequent to Bouie, the United States Supreme Court recognized that this due
process protection extends not only to judicial interpretations of statutes, but also to
judicial alterations of protections that existed only at common law.

See Rogers v.

Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). The Court in Rogers held that a judicial alteration of
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the prior existing common law cannot be retroactively applied under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment where that alteration is "unexpected and indefensible by
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue." Id. at
462. In making this determination, the Rogers Court looked to factors such as whether
the common law at issue retained current justification for its on-going existence,
whether it had been given meaningful effect in prior decisions (as opposed to being
mentioned in passing and as dicta), whether the common law rule involved a
substantive right, and whether the alteration of the reviewing court was consistent with
the actions undertaken in other jurisdictions. Id. at 462-467.
Although the standard articulated in Rogers with regard to when a due process
violation is established is broad in its sweep, the prior Opinion in Bouie
the basis for the Rogers Opinion - provides clearer guidance.

which formed

In Bouie, the U.S.

Supreme Court clarified that, "[w]hen a state court overrules a consistent line
procedural decisions with the retroactive effect of denying a litigant a hearing in a
pending case, it thereby deprive him of due process of law 'in its primary sense of an
opportunity to be heard and to defend (his) substantive right.'" Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354
(quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930))
(emphasis added).

In other words, where there is an established line of case law

wherein a substantive right has been recognized by the courts, an abrupt departure
from this consistent set of holdings cannot be retroactively applied to a criminal
defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Lancaster v.

Metrish, 683 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 2012).
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It was this standard that led the Supreme Court of Colorado to conclude that its
judicial abrogation of the corpus delicti requirement could not be applied retroactively
under due process principles. In People v. LaRosa, the Supreme Court of Colorado
had occasion to revisit the on-going viability of the corpus delicti rule in the context of a
case where the only corroboration of a defendant's confession of sexual assault was the
opportunity for the defendant to have committed the offense. People v. LaRosa, 293
P.3d 567, 570-579 (Colo. 2013). After a discussion of the roots of the corpus delicti rule
under the Colorado common law, the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately abandoned
this rule in favor of a more general trustworthiness standard. Id. However, this did not
end the discussion regarding the disposition of the LaRosa case: the Colorado Supreme
Court still had to resolve whether this alteration could be applied retroactively under the
Due Process Clause.
The LaRosa Court determined that it could not.

In LaRosa, the Court first

distinguished the abolition of the corpus delicti rule from the common law rule at issue in
the Rogers Opinion. LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578-579.

In particular, the LaRosa Court

noted that the common law rule at issue in Rogers was characterized as a "substantive
principle" of law, "'in name only' because it had never been enforced" in any state court
decision, and "had never served as a ground of decision in any homicide prosecution in
the State and had only been mentioned in three cases, each time in dicta." Id. at 579
(quoting Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464).

Although recognizing that the corpus delicti rule

had been subject to some criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless
recognized that the rule had been in actual force in several jurisdictions, including the
court's own prior decisions. Id. In fact, the LaRosa Court noted that the corpus delicti
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rule had been the substantive law in Colorado for over one hundred years.

Id.

Accordingly, because overturning this rule was a clear, and therefore unexpected, break
from well-established case law, the Court in LaRosa held that it would violate due
process to apply the elimination of this rule to those whose convictions arose prior to its
decision. As such, the Court in LaRosa reversed the defendant's conviction. Id.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has also held that it would be
unconstitutional to apply the elimination of its common law corpus delicti rule
retroactively to those whose offenses arose prior to the court's decision. See State v.
Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003). Moreover, the conclusion that the elimination of
the corpus delicti rule cannot be retroactively applied is consistent with prior decisions
from the Supreme Court of Idaho in a related context.
In State v. Byers, this Court eliminated the common law requirement of
corroboration of an alleged victim's allegation of rape in prosecutions for this offense.
State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 160-165 (1981).

However, in doing so this Court

recognized that it was altering the quantum of proof required in order to establish this
offense. Id. at 165-167. In light of this, the Byers Court held that the corroboration rule
must be followed with regard to the defendant in that case, along with those who were
tried prior to the issuance of the Court's opinion. Id.
The Court in Byers so held because, "[t]o apply today's decision in passing on
the validity of Byers' conviction would be the equivalent of applying an ex post facto law,
and is within the prohibitions of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Art.
I, § 16 of our Idaho Constitution." Id. at 166. The Byers Court recognized that the
elimination of the corroboration requirement, "alters the rules of evidence such that 'less
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or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense
(is necessary) in order to convict the offender.'"
(alterations in the original).
announced

rule

eliminating

Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U . at 354)

In light of this, the Byers Court held that the newly
the

corroboration

requirement,

"is to

be

applied

prospectively to criminal trials commenced hereafter." Id. at 167.
As with Byers, Idaho courts prior to Suriner had consistently recognized the
corpus delicti rule in Idaho - dating back over one hundred years to its adoption in
State v. Keller in 1902. 3 See, e.g., State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004); State v. Urie,
92 Idaho 71 (1968); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902); State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820
(Ct. App. 2003). And, like LaRosa, this rule was not one that had never had substantive
force in Idaho

the requirements of corpus delicti were unequivocally recognized as

part of the State's burden of proof of the charged offense at trial. See, e.g., Thomas v.
State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 (Ct. App. 2008); Roth, 138 Idaho at 822.
Moreover, the elimination of the corpus delicti rule in Idaho under Suriner was
particularly unexpected, given that the this Court has left no standard of corroboration in
its wake in order for a conviction to be sustained on the basis of a confession alone. In
eliminating the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, this Court in Suriner held that:
Because the harm caused by the rule exceeds whatever benefits there
may be, we hold that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies in Idaho.
We see no reason to attempt to fashion another rule to take its place.
Instead, the jury can give a defendant's extrajudicial confession or
statement whatever weight it deems appropriate along with all of the other
evidence when deciding whether the State has proved guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

3 By appellate counsel's count, there are approximately 70 cases in Idaho that have
analyzed and applied the corpus delicti rule in Idaho as part of its substantive law. For
sake of brevity, only a sampling of cases are cited herein.
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Suriner, 154 Idaho at 88 (emphasis added).
This represents a drastic departure, not only from over a hundred years of prior
established jurisprudence in Idaho, but with the general requirements for admission of
or use of a confession in order to establish guilt throughout the country. "Courts adhere
universally to the principle that 'an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a crime.'"

Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (quoting

State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (1957)) (emphasis added). This nearly universal
requirement of additional corroboration was further reflected in LaRosa, wherein the
Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that, "[a]lmost all courts adhere to a
corroboration requirement, which requires the prosecution to present corroborating
evidence of a defendant's confession to either allow for its admission into evidence or
sustain a conviction." LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 571 (emphasis added).
Although the modem trend has been to adopt a general trustworthiness standard
with regard to the admission and use of criminal confessions, the fact remains that
some requirement of corroboration remains in nearly all jurisdictions with regard to a
defendant's confessions. Accordingly, the Opinion in Suriner also represents a
departure from the case law in nearly all jurisdictions in that there is now no standard
that has supplanted corpus delicti in ensuring the reliability and factual corroboration of
a criminal confession - or its use as the sole proof of guilt in a criminal case.
Finally, a clear indication that the elimination of corpus delicti in Idaho should not
be retroactively applied comes from this Court Suriner itself. In the Suriner Opinion, this
Court did not apply its decision to eliminate the corpus delicti rule to the defendant's
own case - rather, the Court first analyzed whether the traditional legal standards of

16

corpus delicti had been met in the defendant's case before proceeding to eliminate the

rule, Suriner, 154 Idaho at 1095-1098. This indicates that the elimination of the corpus
delicti rule was not intended by this Court to operate retroactively. Mr. Nichols asks that

this Court expressly make this clear and grant his petition for review.
In addition, Mr. Nichols submits that the Court of Appeals' Opinion, applying the
corpus delicti rule, is likely not in accord with prior decisions from this Court regarding

the minimum standards of evidence for the corroboration requirement of this rule.
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case indicates that mere presence with the
alleged victim or the opportunity to commit the offense of statutory rape is sufficient to
meet with the corroboration requirement of the corpus delicti rule. (Opinion, pp.8-9.)
This holding is in error. In order to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense in
Idaho, the State bears the burden to show either the charged injury or the criminal
agency - and the mere opportunity to commit the charged offense does not meet either
prong.

See Roth, 138 Idaho at 822-823; LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 571-579; People v.

Robson, 80 P.3d 912, 913 (Colo. App. 2003); State v. Campbell, 178 P.3d 337, 340 (Or.

Ct. App. 2008); State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). The reason behind this
was stated succinctly by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Campbell - "The evidence
showing that defendant had an opportunity to commit the offenses establishes only
that-that he had the opportunity; it does not tend to establish that the offenses actually
occurred." Campbell, 178 P.3d at 340.
Likewise, the notion that there existed additional "corroboration" due to the
circumstances under which Mr. Nichols was found in the alleged victim's presence is
similarly misplaced.

While there was testimony as to the alleged victim's age and

17

Mr. Nichols'

the only

as

any actual relationship between them in the

comes directly from Mr. Nichols' own confession to the police. (See Tr., p.85,
L.7

p.8?, L.24; p.95, L.9

98, L.1.)

The corpus delicti rule requires that the

corroboration come from a source aside from the confession itself. See Suriner, 154
Idaho at 83. As was

noted by this Court in Suriner, the corpus delicti rule requires

that, '''there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show
that a crime has been committed,

confessions or statements." Id.

While multiple confessions to third parties may suffice for this rule, using the confession
to "corroborate" itself does not.

/d. at 1095-1098.

Otherwise, there would be no

corroboration requirement at all to the corpus delicti rule - mere intemal consistency
would suffice.
The State failed to establish any proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense
in this case, as was their burden of proof at trial. Accordingly, Mr. Nichols asks that this
Court grant his petition for review in this case.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 Motion Seeking A
Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish
The Corpus De/icW Of The Charged Offense Independent Of Mr. Nichols' Confessions
And Statements

A.

Introduction
Corpus delicti principles require that the State, as part of its burden of proof of

any criminal offense, provide some quantum of evidence independent of a confession to
demonstrate either the injury underpinning the offense or the criminality of the alleged
action. With regard to statutory rape, both the injury and the criminality aspects of this
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offense require proof of intercourse. There was no evidence aside from Mr. Nichols'
alleged confession that corroborated that any intercourse occurred between Mr. Nichols
and K.F. Given this, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Nichols' Idaho Criminal
Rule 29 motion seeking a judgment of acquittal based upon the failure of the State to
prove the corpus delicti of the charged offense.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of the district court's denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion

seeking a judgment of acquittal, this Court will not reverse a verdict on such grounds
where every element of the offense is established by substantial and competent
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1997). All of the
inferences from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Id.
This Court will likewise not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of the
evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the
evidence for that of the jury.

See, e.g., State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510

(Ct. App. 1998). Further, matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of
the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within
the province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701 (Ct. App.
1997).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 Motion Seeking A
Judgment Of Acquittal Because State Presented Insufficient Evidence To
Establish The Corpus Delicia Independent Of Mr. Nichols' Confessions And
Statements
"A plea of not guilty puts in issue every material allegation of the indictment."

State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 296 (1971). One of the material allegations that is placed

at issue in every criminal offense is the corpus delicti of the charged offense.

Id;

State v. Pullos, 76 Idaho 369,373-374 (1955). The prosecution has the burden of proof

of the corpus delicti. Id.
"Corpus delicti, meaning, 'the body of a crime,' is a common law principle that

requires the state to establish some evidence that a crime occurred independently from
a defendant's confession." State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820, 822 (Ct. App. 2003); see also
Suriner, 154 Idaho at 83.

This principle applies both to a defendant's extrajudicial

admissions, as well as extrajudicial confessions. Roth, 138 Idaho at 822 n.2. For every
criminal offense, in order to prove the offense at trial, the burden is on the State to prove
three broad elements: (1) that an injury occurred; (2) that the injury was caused by
criminal agency; and (3) the identity of the person who caused the injury. Id. at 823. In
Idaho, the State must present corroborating evidence - other than a confession - of
either of the first two elements in order to establish the corpus delicti of the charged
offense.

Id.

Only slight corroboration by independent evidence is required.

Id.

However, the corroboration must relate to establishing either the injury or that the injury
was produced by criminal agency.

See a/so Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 771

(Ct. App. 2008).
As this offense existed at the time of Mr. Nichols' trial, Idaho defined statutory
rape as the penetration, however, slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with the
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perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female who is under the age of 18. 4

§ 18-6101 (1) (2010) (amended by

L. 2010, ch.

§

See

eff.July1,2010;S.L.

2010, ch. 352, § 1, eff. July 1, 2010). The "injury" addressed by this statute is sexual
intercourse; and the "criminality" is proof of sexual intercourse with a female who is
under the age of 18. Under this statutory scheme, the injury and the criminality prongs
of this offense are partly co-extensive.

Both require some independent proof or

corroboration of the act of sexual intercourse. See also State v. Smith, 265 P. 666, 667
(1928) (holding that corpus delicti of statutory rape is proof of intercourse).
In this case, there is absolutely no corroboration of any sexual intercourse
between Mr. Nichols and K.F. independent of his confession or admissions. K.F. did
not testify at trial. There was no forensic or medical examination of K.F. presented as
evidence to the jury.

Law enforcement officers did not even verify that K.F. and

Mr. Nichols were, in fact, living together - the only evidence of that came from the same
confession wherein Mr. Nichols allegedly admitted to sexual intercourse.
Ls.3-22.)

(Tr., p.86,

There is, in this case, nothing at all that would corroborate that sexual

intercourse occurred between Mr. Nichols and K.F. aside from Mr. Nichols' confession.
Because the corpus delicti doctrine requires corroboration of sexual intercourse in
support of a finding of either injury or criminality with regard to the offense of statutory
rape, and because there was no corroboration of this aspect of Mr. Nichols' confession
at all at trial, the district court erred in this case when it denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29

The Idaho State legislature has subsequently amended Idaho's rape statute - and, in
particular, Idaho's formulation of statutory rape - in 2010. The amended statute now
makes two separate provisions regarding statutory rape, and defines the offense in
terms of the differential in age between the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator.
See I.e. §§ 18-6101(1), (2).
4
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motion seeking a judgment of acquittal. Therefore, Mr. Nichols' conviction for statutory
rape must be dismissed with prejudice.

III.
The District Court Erred When It Permitted, Over Mr. Nichols' Objection, The
Introduction Of Inadmissible Hearsay In Order To Establish The Age Of The Alleged
Victim In This Case
A.

Introduction
The sole testimony presented in this case as to K.F.'s age at the time of the

alleged sexual intercourse - which is an essential element to the charge of statutory
rape in Idaho - came in the form of hearsay testimony from two of the three witnesses
for the State. Mr. Nichols submits that this testimony was erroneously admitted by the
district court and, because this hearsay was the sole evidence of one of the essential
elements of the charged offense in this case, this error was not harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
Where a defendant makes a contemporaneous objection as to the admission of

evidence, this Court employs an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 218 (2010). This standard involves a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the
district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court
acted within the proper boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal
standards attendant on that discretion; and (3) whether the district court reached its
decision through an exercise of reason. Id. In every case where the defendant objects
to the error before the district court, the defendant bears the initial burden to establish
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that error occurred, but the State bears the burden to establish, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the error was harmless. Id. at 222.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted, Over Mr. Nichols' Objection, The
Introduction Of Inadmissible Hearsay In Order To Establish The Age Of The
Alleged Victim In This Case

1.

The District Court Erroneously Admitted Hearsay Testimony From K.F.'S
Adopted Mother Because There Was Insufficient Foundation For
Admission Of This Testimony Under I.R.E. 803(19)

The district court in this case initially - and erroneously - ruled that Ms. Fairfax's
testimony regarding K.F.'s purported date of birth was not hearsay, and therefore
allowed this testimony to be admitted at trial for proof of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.53,
Ls.2-22.) Likely in recognition of its error, the district court entered a memorandum
several days after the jury's verdict in this case "augmenting" the record to alter this
ruling. (R., p.73.) As an alternative basis for allowing the testimony of K.F.'s adopted
mother as to K.F.'s birth date, the court concluded that such testimony fell within the
hearsay exception for reputation concerning personal or family history contained in
!.R.E.803(19). Mr. Nichols asserts that either ruling on the part of the district court was
error.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently artiCUlated the limitations attendant on
the district court's discretion with regard to admissibility determinations regarding the
Idaho Rules of Evidence.

The Court in State v. Watkins cited with approval the

following statement of law on such issues:
The law of evidence is structured by rules, forged by centuries of
experience and continually tested against evolving notions of fairness and
truth-seeking. Our Supreme Court recently has adopted a detailed and
painstakingly drafted formulation of such rules. See Idaho Rules of
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Evidence (effective July 1,1985).
rules are not merely
guides to discretion; they are standards controlling the outcome
judge possesses no "discretionary"
disregard specific standards~particularly
standards impart real meaning
an

State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,420-421 (2009) (quoting State v. May/ett, 108 Idaho

671,674 (Ct. App. 1985) (Burnett, J., specially concurring)) (emphasis added).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 defines "hearsay" as, "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." LRE. 801 (c). While hearsay may not generally
be introduced into evidence, there are some exceptions to this rule.

One such

exception is a statement regarding reputation concerning personal or family history.
See LR.

802,803(19).

Following Mr. Nichols' trial, the district court determined that Ms. Fairfax's
testimony regarding what she was told as to K.F.'s birth date fell within the hearsay
exception for reputation concerning personal or family history contained in LRE.
803(19). (R, p.73.) There does not appear to be any case law in Idaho regarding the
"reputation concerning personal or family history" exception to the prohibition against
hearsay.

However, this provision is substantially similar to that employed in other

jurisdictions, and therefore an examination of cases from other jurisdictions regarding
the requirements under this exception may be instructive for this Court.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that statements regarding a common familial
understanding regarding a family member's birth date (or the circumstances of his or
her birth) is hearsay when not based upon personal knowledge of the witness- but that
such testimony may fall within the "reputation concerning personal or family history"
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exception to the prohibition against introduction of hearsay evidence. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999). However, for such evidence to be

admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, a sufficient foundation must be laid. And
each hearsay link in the chain of communications regarding this matter must also fall
within a hearsay exception. See !.R.E. 805; Blackburn
179 F.3d 81, 101 n.14 (3d Cir. 1999); State
2007).

V.

V.

United Parcel Service, Inc.,

Taylor, 240 S.W.3d 789, 799-801 (Tenn.

In addition, federal case law indicates that, in addition to considerations of

whether a sufficient foundation has been laid, a trial court should also consider
additional factors such as how significant the evidence is to the issues disputed at trial,
the availability of other evidence of the facts testified to, and the nature of the litigation.
Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 100.

In this case, while K.F.'s adopted mother is presumably familiar with those facts
and occurrences within their family from the time that K.F. came to be adopted, her
mother was not present at the time she was born and had no apparent personal
knowledge of the circumstances of K.F.'s birth other than what she was told. (Tr., p.50,
L.18 - p.53, L.22.)

Given this, Ms. Fairfax's testimony regarding K.F.'s birth date

constituted hearsay.

Assuming for purposes of argument that testimony from an

adopted parent regarding the adopted child's birth date falls within the hearsay
exception contained in !.R.E. 803(19), there was insufficient foundation to establish the
trustworthiness of the information that K.F. adopted mother relied on as to K.F.'s birth
date.

There was, therefore, an insufficient foundation for the admission of this

testimony under !.R.E. 803(19).
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In addition, the district court failed to consider the other relevant factors identified
by the Blackburn Court with regard to admissibility of hearsay evidence under the
personal or family reputation exception. 5 Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 100. A review of these
factors likewise militates against the admissibility of this testimony as the sole
substantive proof of an element of a criminal offense. The significance of this evidence
was immense for the State - the age of the alleged victim was an essential component
of its criminal charge and the absence of proof of this element precluded a criminal
conviction. Given this, greater caution with regard to admission of hearsay testimony
should have been exercised.
Second, there were other potential sources of information that were likely more
reliable, given that the record at trial does not indicate that Ms. Fairfax had any direct,
personal knowledge of the circumstances of K.F.'s birth.

Presumably there was an

official birth certificate created upon K.F.'s birth, although such a document was not
admitted at trial. In light of the fact that there was a more reliable and direct source of
evidence for the fact at issue, this also weighed against the admission of this hearsay
testimony.
Finally, the nature of these proceedings also demonstrates that the admission of
this hearsay was error. As noted in the above-quoted passage from Watkins, in criminal
trials, the rules of evidence "impart real meaning to an accused's right to a fair trial."
Watkins, 148 Idaho at 421.

Given the heightened interests at stake in criminal

5 This is quite likely because the district court failed to recognize that this evidence was
hearsay until after trial. (Compare Tr., p.53, Ls.2-22; R., pp.73-74.)
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proceedings, the district court should not have admitted this hearsay evidence before
the jury for the truth of the matters asserted.

2.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted Officer Fuentes To Testify In
Re-Direct Examination As To Hearsay Regarding K.F.'S Purported Status
As A Runaway, Despite The Fact That The District Court Had Previously
Ruled That This Exact Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay

During the State's direct examination of Officer Fuentes, the following exchange
took place:
Q:

And after speaking to them [a party from the Everett Police
Department in Washington State], what did you do next?

A:

I confirmed with the state of Washington - there was some
confusion as to whether or not [K.F.] was a missing person or she
was a runaway, and I had to clarify which one she was.
it
me that she was, in
a

DEFENSE COUNSEL:
COURT:

I'm going to

to hearsay.

I'm going to sustain the objection.

Tr., p.108, LS.8-19.
At that point, the State moved on to another line of questioning. However, on redirect examination, the State sought to introduce an identical line of questioning
specifically to establish the truth of the matter asserted - i.e., that K.F. was, in fact, a
runaway as evidence that she was under the age of 18. (Tr., p.111, 1.25 - p.113, 1.2.)
Oddly, despite the fact that the district court had already determined that this
evidence was inadmissible hearsay, the court reversed its ruling when Mr. Nichols
objected on hearsay grounds. (Tr., p.112, 1.21 - p.113, 1.2.) The basis for the court's
ruling was that the officer, "had already testified to that." (Tr., p.113, Ls.1-2.) This was
error for two reasons.

First, the district court was incorrect in its recollection of the
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officer's prior testimony - the court had actually sustained the objection to the officer
testifying as to what he was told regarding whether K.F. was a runaway and therefore
this testimony was not properly before the jury.
But second, and more importantly, this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. The
Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Boehner is instructive on this point. See
State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311 (1988). In Boehner, several police officers testified as
to the substance of a dispatch that they had received that indicated the defendant had
previously stated that he "wanted to kill a cop." Id. at 313.

Defense counsel filed a

motion in limine prior to trial to exclude this testimony and objected to this testimony as
hearsay at trial.

Id. at 313-314.

The district court permitted this testimony to be

presented at trial. Id.
The Boehner Court determined that the district court erred when it permitted this
testimony to be introduced into evidence.

Boehner 114 Idaho at 314.

First, this

evidence was not relevant to the case for the non-hearsay purpose identified by the
district court - the information possessed by the officers at the time that they confronted
the defendant and how this influenced their actions.

Id. at 314. The Boehner Court

recognized that this was irrelevant to the jurors - while the jury was charged with
determining the defendant's intent with regard to the charged offense there was no
aspect of the charge at issue that dealt with the police officers' "collective state of mind."
Id.
The only thing that this hearsay testimony was relevant to establish for purposes
of the charged offense in Boehner - that is, the intent of the defendant - would
expressly have to embrace the truth of the matter asserted from the police dispatch. Id.
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at 314-315. Because the only relevance of this evidence of an out-of-court assertion
required the jurors to first assume the truth of the matter asserted, which is prohibited
under I.R.E. 802, the Boehner Court held that it was error for this evidence to have been
admitted attrial. Id. at 315.
Here, it is abundantly clear that the State was seeking to admit this evidence for
the truth of the matter asserted.

This is apparent in the manner in which the State

initially attempted to frame the question to Officer Fuentes on re-direct examination.
The State first asked the officer, "Officer Fuentes, you just testified that you had not
been provided the age of [K.F.].
known

she was

was a

wouldn't you

18?" (Tr., p.111, L.25 - p.112, L.3) (emphasis added.)

When the officer didn't understand the question, the State later rephrased the question
to ask specifically whether K.F. was, in fact, a runaway from Washington. (Tr., p.112,
L.21 - p.113, L.2.) Again, the context of the State's question was to demonstrate the
truth of the matter asserted in order to show that K.F. was under the age of 18, which
was an essential element of Mr. Nichols' charged offense. The district court erred when
it determined otherwise.
The only proof at all in Mr. Nichols' trial as to the age of the alleged victim came
solely through hearsay testimony. Mr. Nichols asserts that none of this testimony was
properly admitted. Moreover, because this testimony was the sole proof of an essential
element of the offense of statutory rape, the introduction of this testimony was not
harmless.
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IV.

The District Court's Jury Instructions In This Case Impermissibly Lowered The State's
Burden Of Proof, And Constituted Fundamental Error, When The District Court Provided
An Elements Instruction For The Offense Of Statutory Rape That Omitted An Element
And When The District Court Failed To Sua Sponte Instruct The Jury Regarding Corpus
Delicti
A.

Introduction
The district court's non-pattem elements instruction to the jury omitted the

element that the State had to prove that Mr. Nichols had penetrated the alleged victim
with his penis.

Additionally, the district court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury

regarding the State's burden of proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense,
particularly in relation to the requirement of some degree of corroboration of the
underlying alleged injury or criminality. Both omissions relieved the State of its burden
of proof at trial, and therefore rose to the level of a due process violation, and neither
omission was harmless. Because of this, the district court's jury instruction errors rose
to the level of a fundamental error requiring reversal.

B.

Standard Of Review
Review for fundamental error is reserved for those alleged errors that are of

constitutional magnitude.

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.

In cases of un-objected to,

fundamental error, a three-part test governs this Court's review.

First, the defendant

must demonstrate that one or more of his or her un-waived constitutional rights were
violated. Id. Second, the error must be "clear and obvious, without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." Id. Finally, the defendant must
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demonstrate that the error affected his or her substantial rights

i.e. that there is a

reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id.
This Court reviews alleged errors in the jury instructions provided by the district
court for fundamental error where those errors are of a constitutional magnitude. See,
e.g., State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 746-748 (2007). Where the defendant alleges a
violation of his or her constitutional rights with regard to the trial court's jury instructions,
this Court will defer to the district court's findings of fact, but reviews de novo the district
court's application of those facts to the constitutional requirements. Id. at 746. "The
propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review." Id. In reviewing an issue regarding jury instructions, this Court must determine
whether the instructions, when viewed as a whole, fairly and adequately present the
issues and state the applicable law. Id.

C.

The District Court's Elements Instruction To The Jury Regarding The Charge Of
Statutory Rape Omitted An Essential Element Of This Offense, And This
Omission Constitutes Fundamental Error
While Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) generally precludes raising allegations of error

with regard to jury instructions for the first time on appeal, a reviewing court in Idaho can
consider such issues if the allegation of error rises to the level of a fundamental error.
Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748.

An instruction that omits any element of the charged

offense, or otherwise relieves the State of its burden of proof at trial, violates due
process and may be reviewed by this Court for fundamental error. Id.
The district court's instruction on this case with regard to the elements instruction
provided as follows:
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Rape, as charged in the
Information, the State must prove each of the following:
(1)

On or between the 1st day of August 2009 and the 21 st day
of August 2009

(2)

in the state of Idaho

(3)

the defendant TIMOTHY L. NICHOLS did penetrate the
vaginal opening of K.F., a female person, and

(4)

K.F. was under the age of eighteen years of age.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
(Jury Instruction 13, Augment; Tr., p.135, L.13 - p.136, L.1.)
This instruction was not in conformance with the model pattern jury instruction for
statutory rape, which directly instructs the jury that they must find the defendant
his penis

LCIIIIJI~iI::U

penetrate, however slightly, the vaginal opening of the alleged victim. See

ICJI 901 (emphasis added). The instruction given by the court omitted the element that
the penetration was caused by the defendant's penis. As has been noted, at the time
Mr. Nichols was alleged to have committed statutory rape, Idaho defined statutory rape
as the penetration, however, slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with the
perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female who is under the age of 18.

See

I.C. § 18-6101(1) (2010) (amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 235, § 7, eff. July 1, 2010; S.L.
2010, ch. 352, § 1, eff. July 1, 2010). Given that the district court's instruction omitted a
statutory element from the charged offense, this was error plain on the face of the
record.
The failure of defense counsel to object to this omission was not the product of
trial strategy. Mr. Nichols pleaded not guilty, thereby putting each and every element of
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the charged offense at issue in his trial. See Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296; I.C. 19-1715. In
such

there is no tactical advantage to be gained from excusing the State of its

burden of proof. Therefore, the failure to object to this error was not the product of a
strategic determination on Mr. Nichols' part
Finally, the omission of this element by the district court was not harmless. The
test for harmlessness is whether there is a reasonable possibility that this error - the
omission of a material element

could have affected the outcome of the trial.

Particularly when viewed in conjunction with the absence of any proof of sexual
intercourse aside from Mr. Nichols' confession to law enforcement, a reasonable juror
could have easily found in Mr. Nichols' favor with regard to this element.

D.

The District Court Had A Duty To Sua Sponte Instruct The Jury With Regard To
Proof Regarding The Corpus Delicti Of The Charged Offense, And The Failure
To Do So Was Fundamental Error As It Reduced The State's Burden Of Proof At
Trial
"In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for

their information." State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,247 (2008); I.C. § 19-2132(a). While
there is no duty on the part of the district court to instruct the jury on every theory of the
defense that a defendant may have, the failure of the district court to sua sponte instruct
the jury as to a particular point of law may be raised on appeal if the "instruction
constitutes a necessary matter of law whose omission would constitute fundamental
error." Id. at 248. An instruction that relieves the State of its burden of proof at trial
violates due process and may be reviewed by this Court for fundamental error.
Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748.
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The district court was well aware of the corpus delicti issue in this case.
Mr. Nichols had asserted that there would be insufficient independent proof of the
corpus delicti should the victim not testify at trial at the hearing on the State's motion in
limine. (Tr., p.i3, L. 7

p.18, L.i5.) The State provided written briefing on this issue

prior to tria/. (R., pp.46-47.) Finally, the absence of independent proof or corroboration
of the corpus delicti formed the basis of Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 motion seeking a judgment
of acquittal.

(Tr., p.116, Ls.1 0-23.) Taken together, the district court had abundant

notice that the absence of independent proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense
was a critical dispute in this case, and therefore the jury needed to be instructed on this
issue.
In addition, the failure of the district court to instruct the jury regarding corpus
delicti rose to the level of a due process violation constituting fundamental error
because this omission reduced the State's burden of proof. As previously noted, one of
the material allegations at issue in every criminal offense is the corpus delicti of the
charged offense, and the State bears the burden of proving corpus delicti at trial.
Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296 State v. Pullos, 76 Idaho 369, 373-374 (1955). However, the
jury was never told that the State has this burden.
The jury in this case was never instructed that, in order to sustain a conviction for
statutory rape, the State was required to produce some independent evidence, aside
from Mr. Nichols' confession, to corroborate that sexual intercourse occurred in this
case. (Tr., p.133, L.9 - p.140, L.19.) Moreover, the failure of defense counsel to object
to the absence of a corpus delicti instruction in this case was not a tactical decision. As
has been noted, Mr. Nichols argued the absence of proof of corpus delicti prior to trial
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and through a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case.
(Te, p.13, L.7

p.18, L.1

p.116, Ls.10-23.) Given that the absence of any outside

corroboration was identified by Mr. Nichols as an area of the State's case where there
was no proof at all to support the State's evidentiary burden, there is no reasonable
strategic reason why Mr. Nichols would then decline to inform the jury as to the
requirements of corroboration under the corpus delicti rule.
In light of this, there is every possibility that the district court's omissions in
instructing the jury regarding the State's burden of proof of corpus delicti, and as to the
elements for statutory rape, very likely affected the outcome of the proceedings in
Mr. Nichols' trial.

Such an omission rises to the level of a fundamental error, and

requires reversal in this case.

v.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error,
When The Prosecutor Misstated The Testimony Provided At Trial And Introduced Facts
Not In Evidence For The Jury's Consideration During Closing Arguments

A.

Introduction
The prosecutor in Mr. Nichols case argued facts that were never introduced into

evidence twice during closing arguments.

Both sets of facts were prejudicial, and

tended to bolster the State's allegations in a case that was otherwise largely devoid of
any proof. Because this argument constitutes an error of a constitutional magnitude,
that is plain from the record and was not harmless, Mr. Nichols asserts that this
misconduct constituted fundamental, reversible error.
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Standard Of Review
This Court reviews an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct that is not objected
to

trial for fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. As previously noted, a three-

part test govems this Court's review: first, the defendant must demonstrate that one or
more of his or her un-waived constitutional rights were violated; second, the error must
be clear and obvious from the record, and not the product of trial strategy; and third, the
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial. Id.

C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental
Error, When The Prosecutor Misstated The Testimony Provided At Trial And
Introduced Facts Not In Evidence For The Jury's Consideration During Closing
Arguments
Mr. Nichols asserts that the prosecutor, at two distinct points during closing

arguments, argued facts that were not in evidence. Although this misconduct was not
objected to at trial, Mr. Nichols further asserts that this misconduct rises to the level of a
fundamental error that is properly justiciable by this Court.
The purpose of closing arguments is to sharpen and clarify the issues that the
jury is charged with resolving at trial, to enlighten the jury as to the legal arguments at
stake, and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Phillips, 144
Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007).

Given the broad nature of this task, both sides have

traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in presenting their closing arguments to
the jury. Id.
"Considerable latitude, however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated
and those implied." Id. It is well-established that it constitutes prosecutorial misconduct
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for the State to argue facts not properly introduced as evidence at trial during closing
arguments. See, e.g., State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980) (overruled on other
grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981 )); State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho
173,183-184 (1953); State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,911-912 (Ct. App. 2010). As
was noted by the court in Troutman, "The desire for success should never induce a
prosecutor to obtain a verdict by argument based upon anything except the evidence in
the case and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the
same." Troutman, 148 at Idaho at 908.
Additionally, the Perry Court has indicated that this type of misconduct rises to
the level of a due process violation that is properly justiciable under the fundamental
error doctrine. "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial,
including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
In this case, the prosecutor referred to facts that were never introduced into
evidence at two separate points during his closing argument. The first instance came
as the prosecutor was setting forth the testimony of Officer Fuentes. In discussing the
officer's discussion with K.F., the prosecutor characterized the officer's testimony as
follows:
During the course or based upon what he leamed from that interview with
[K.F.], he felt something wasn't right. And because he felt something
wasn't right about what he heard, he passed the report on to the detective
division so further investigation could be performed.
Tr., p.143, Ls.15-21.
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In actuality, there was never any testimony at all about what it was that K.F. told
Officer Fuentes, and the officer never testified as to having any sort of feeling that
something "wasn't right," based upon his conversation with K.F. (Tr., p.110, Ls.10-21.)
The sole testimony that was had was that the officer turned the case over to a detective
following his interview of K.F. (Tr., p.110, Ls.10-21.) Moreover, in repeatedly stating
that Officer Fuentes had felt something "wasn't right," based upon the undisclosed
statements that K.F. made, the prosecutor was inviting the jury to speculate further as to
what K.F. may have told the officer that would have caused him such concern.
The second instance of the prosecutor commenting on facts not in evidence dealt
with the testimony of the other law enforcement officer in this case - Detective Larsen.
The prosecutor stated that the detective had testified that, not only did Mr. Nichols state
that he and K.F. shared a bedroom in the apartment that Mr. Nichols resided in, but that
they both shared the same bed in this room.

(Tr., p.146, L.22.)

This was not the

substance of the detective's testimony. Detective Larsen only testified that Mr. Nichols
had told him that he shared a room with K.F., not that the two slept in the same bed
within this room. (Tr., p.86, Ls.15-18.) There was no testimony at trial that the detective
had ever been inside the two-bedroom apartment and had verified that there was only
one bed in the room that Mr. Nichols allegedly shared with K.F. (Tr., p.68, L.22 - p.98,
L.3.)
As previously noted, it is misconduct that constitutes a due process violation for a
prosecutor to refer to facts never introduced into evidence during closing arguments.
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This error is also plain on the face of this record, and was
not the product of any legitimate trial strategy. Mr. Nichols stood to gain absolutely no
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strategic advantage from the introduction of damaging factual allegations that were
never subjected to the test of cross~examination during the witnesses' testimony.
Additionally, there is a reasonable possibility that this misconduct affected the
outcome of Mr. Nichols' trial.

Both statements of alleged facts not in evidence were

intended to strengthen and reinforce the inference of a romantic and/or sexual
relationship between Mr. Nichols and K.F. - a relationship for which there was no proof
at all outside of Mr. Nichols' own confession. There was not even any circumstantial
proof, aside from the confession, to sustain such a finding. Therefore, the prosecutor's
allegations of facts not in evidence during closing arguments in this case was directed
at the question at the heart of the criminal allegations at trial and for which the State had
virtually no evidence at all.

In such circumstances, there is every possibility that this

type of misconduct affected the outcome of the trial.
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct rising to the level of
reversible, fundamental error when the prosecutor argued prejudicial facts that were
never admitted into evidence in asking the jury to convict Mr. Nichols of the charged
offense. Given this, Mr. Nichols asserts that this Court should reverse his conviction for
statutory rape with prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for
statutory rape with prejudice, as there was insufficient evidence of the charged offense.
In the alternative, Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment
of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 28 th day of April, 2014.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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